

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BUENOS 00812 01 OF 03 011909Z

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00  
SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03  
PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 IO-13 ACDA-12 MCE-00  
AID-05 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-08 IGA-02 HA-05 EUR-12  
AF-10 OES-07 DOE-11 SOE-02 DOEE-00 AGRE-00 MCT-01  
/139 W

-----119352 012020Z /41

O R 011851Z FEB 78

FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4393

INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

AMEMBASSY LA PAZ

AMEMBASSY LIMA

AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO

AMEMBASSY QUITO

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 0812

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, MASS, MORG, PGOV, SHUM, AR

SUBJECT: US-LATIN AMERICA MILITARY RELATIONS: ARGENTINA

REF: 77 STATE 306726

SUMMARY: THE ARGENTINE MILITARY CAN BE  
EXPECTED TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE  
ARGENTINE POLITICAL PROCESS THROUGH THE  
1980S, AS IT HAS ON PAST OCCASIONS WHEN  
ELECTED GOVERNMENTS PROVED DYSFUNCTIONAL.  
FORMERLY CAREFULLY DEVELOPED AND EXCELLENT  
US-ARGENTINE BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONS  
CONTRIBUTED TO US ACCESS, INFLUENCE AND  
ITS MODERATING EFFECT ON ARMS PURCHASES  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BUENOS 00812 01 OF 03 011909Z

IN ARGENTINE AND THE HEMISPHERE IN GENERAL.  
THE EFFECT OF US SANCTIONS POLICY HAS HELPED SENSITIZE  
ARGENTINE LEADERS TO INTERNATIONAL CONCERN FOR HUMAN  
RIGHTS, BUT HAS NOT AMELIORATED SPECIFIC WRONGS AND HAS  
BADLY STRAINED MILITARY RELATIONS IN PARTICULAR. AS A  
RESULT, ARGENTINE IS TURNING TO THIRD COUNTRY SUPPLIERS  
FOR ARMS AND LICENSING AGREEMENTS TO BUILD UP ITS OWN

MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX; A SITUATION WHICH COULD SPUR, NOT REIN, HEMISPHERIC ARMS IMBALANCE AND A POTENTIAL ARMS RACE. END SUMMARY.

1. THE ARGENTINE MILITARY HAS PLAYED A PROMINENT--AND PENDULAR--ROLE IN ARGENTINE POLITICAL LIFE SINCE THE 1930S. THE MILITARY HERE IS POLITICIZED TO THE EXTENT THAT IT TAKES CHARGE OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT WHEN "REPRESENTATIONAL" SYSTEMS BECOME DYSFUNCTIONAL, AS HAPPENED IN MARCH 1976. IN THE CASE OF THE 1976 COUP THERE WAS WIDE CONSENSUS THAT EXISTING GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME DYSFUNCTIONAL; ON OTHER OCCASIONS THE JUDGMENT HAS HAD LESS PUBLIC SUPPORT. THE FINAL DECISION IN ANY EVENT IS ONE MADE BY THE MILITARY ITSELF.

2. THE PRESENT MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS DECLARED IT WILL REMAIN IN POWER UNTIL SUCH TIME AS IT CAN OVERCOME ARGENTINA'S CHRONIC POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CRISES BY REORGANIZING THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, LABOR AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. BARRING A SUDDEN CAPITULATION OF THE ARMED FORCES TO DEMANDS FOR CIVILIAN ELECTIONS--FOR WHICH THERE IS HISTORICAL PRECEDENT--THE ARGENTINE MILITARY CAN BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN IN POWER UNTIL WELL INTO THE 1980S. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE COUNTRY IS IN MILITARY OR CIVILIAN HANDS, THE MILITARY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO HAVE MAJOR INFLUENCE  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BUENOS 00812 01 OF 03 011909Z

AND TO PLAY THE ROLE OF OVERSEER OR GUARANTOR OF ANY CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT.

3. THE CURRENT PREDOMINANCE OF THE MILITARY IN ARGENTINA REQUIRES THAT BILATERAL RELATIONS BE CONDUCTED THROUGH MILITARY OFFICIALS. THE MILITARY HOLD ALL LEGISLATIVE POWER THROUGH THE JUNTA; ALL BUT TWO CABINET POSITIONS AND ALL PROVINCIAL GOVERNORSHIPS ARE HELD BY MILITARY OFFICERS; THE MILITARY HAS APPOINTED ALL MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND MANY FEDERAL JUDGES; MILITARY INTERVENTORS ARE IN MANY UNIONS, SOME COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA AND MANY STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES.

4. THE ARGENTINE MILITARY'S TRADITIONAL ORIENTATION TOWARD THE US THROUGH TRAINING AND OFFICER EXCHANGE PROGRAMS AND ACQUISITION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAS FAVORABLY DISPOSED MANY OF THE CURRENT ARGENTINE MILITARY LEADERS TOWARD THE US, AND HAS FACILITATED OUR ACCESS TO ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES WHILE ENSURING ARGENTINE AWARENESS AND CONSIDERATION OF US POLICY AS IT AFFECTS OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH US CIVILIAN OFFICIALS HAVE NO PROBLEM IN MEETING WITH THE RELATIVELY

SOPHISTICATED ARGENTINE OFFICERS SERVING IN POLITICAL ROLES, PERSONAL MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS ARE IMPORTANT IN UNDERSCORING TOTAL USG COMMITMENT TO POLICY GOALS AND IN MAINTAINING THE FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATION AND MUTUAL RESPECT VIS-A-VIS OUR ONGOING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AND HEMISPHERIC INTERESTS BOTH WHEN THE MILITARY IS IN AND OUTSIDE THE POLITICAL ARENA.

5. US SECURITY INTERESTS HERE DERIVE FROM ARGENTINA'S GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION IN THE SOUTHERN ATLANTIC, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT SOVIET/CUBAN INFLUENCE IN AFRICA AND THE STRAIN IN OUR RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA. US ACCESS TO ARGENTINE BASES, AIRPORTS AND SEAPORTS AND REFUELING ASSISTANCE WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN THE EVENT OF  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BUENOS 00812 01 OF 03 011909Z

CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. SHOULD THE PANAMA CANAL BECOME UNAVAILABLE, US COMMERCIAL AND NAVAL REFUELING WOULD DEPEND ON SOUTHERN-CONE SUPPORT. ARGENTINA'S APPROACHING SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN PETROLEUM WOULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE. OTHER US INTERESTS SUCH AS COOPERATION IN MULTILATERAL FORA, ANTARCTICA, LAW OF

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BUENOS 00812 02 OF 03 011937Z  
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00  
SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03  
PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 IO-13 ACDA-12 MCE-00  
AID-05 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-08 IGA-02 HA-05 EUR-12  
AF-10 OES-07 DOE-11 SOE-02 DOEE-00 AGRE-00 MCT-01  
/139 W

-----119905 012021Z /41

O R 011851Z FEB 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4394  
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION  
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY LIMA

AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 0812

OF THE SEAS, NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND NUCLEAR  
NON-PROLIFERATION, WORLD FOOD NEEDS, AND HEMISPHERIC  
PEACE ALSO DEPEND IN PART ON CONTINUING GOOD RELATIONS  
WITH ARGENTINA.

6. US MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINE MILITARY  
HAVE BEEN OUTSTANDING UNTIL RECENTLY, WHEN US LEGISLATION  
AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS EFFECTIVELY BRAKED  
BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS. THE ARGENTINE MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT IS ACUTELY DISMAYED BY US ACTIONS AFFECTING  
MILITARY RELATIONS INCLUDING THE REDUCTION OF FMS SALES,  
REDUCTION OF THE SIZE OF THE US MILITARY MISSION TO  
ARGENTINA, NON-APPROPRIATION OF FY78 IMET GRANT TRAINING  
FUNDS, AND LACK OF AUTHORIZATION FOR ARGENTINA TO PURCHASE  
MILITARY TRAINING IN THE US FOR CASH. ARGENTINA IS ALSO  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BUENOS 00812 02 OF 03 011937Z

INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY EXISTING US LEGISLATION WHICH  
WILL PROHIBIT ANY FMS PURCHASES OR EXPORT LICENSES OR  
TRAINING FOR ARGENTINA AFTER SEPTEMBER 30, 1978.

7. AS THE MAJORITY OF THE MILITARY HARDWARE IN THE  
ARGENTINE ARSENAL IS OF US ORIGIN AND REQUIRES US  
SPARE PARTS SUPPORT, FAILURE TO RECEIVE THIS SUPPORT  
HAS AND WILL RESULT IN DEADLINING OF EQUIPMENT. CURRENT  
APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS THROUGH THE USG'S REFUSAL TO  
GRANT EXPORT LICENSES EVEN PRIOR TO THE LEGISLATIVE  
CUTOFF HAS EXACERBATED THE SITUATION. THE ARGENTINE  
GOVERNMENT BELIEVES IT SHOULD BE ALLOWED THE TIME AND  
OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE ITS HUMAN RIGHTS IMAGE, AS THEY  
BELIEVE IS THE INTENT OF THE LAW. GOVERNMENT MEMBERS  
ALSO CONSIDER THE USG UNRELIABLE IN MEETING ITS BUSINESS  
OBLIGATIONS AND FEEL THAT SINCE THEY HAVE PURCHASED MOST  
OF THEIR US EQUIPMENT WITH REPAYABLE CREDITS OR CASH,  
THE USG IS MORALLY OBLIGATED TO SELL THEM SPARE PARTS  
FOR THIS EQUIPMENT. OF GREATEST CONCERN TO THE ARGENTINES  
AT PRESENT IS THE US REFUSAL TO DATE TO PERMIT PURCHASE  
FOR CASH OF US TRAINING. THIS IS A CRITICAL ISSUE WITHIN  
THE ARGENTINE MILITARY AND SEVERAL HIGH RANKING OFFICIALS  
HAVE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT US REFUSAL COULD POSSIBLY  
BE "THE LAST STRAW".

8. CURRENT US POLICY IS PERCEIVED BY THE ARGENTINE MILITARY  
AS A SIGN THAT THE US CONSIDERS GOOD BILATERAL

RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AS EXPENDABLE. THE US EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS OVERSHADOWS ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, AN ATTITUDE WHICH IS STRONGLY RESENTED BY THE ARGENTINE MILITARY AND MANY OTHERS. THE BELIEF HERE THAT US POLICY IS SELECTIVE AND BIASED AGAINST ARGENTINA HAS LIMITED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR POLICY.  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BUENOS 00812 02 OF 03 011937Z

ARGENTINES BELIEVE THEY ARE MARKED FOR "PUNISHMENT" REGARDLESS OF THEIR INTERNAL PROBLEMS OR THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION; THEY SEE THEMSELVES VICTIMS OF A CONSPIRACY AND THEY OFTEN TELL US THAT IF THE US COULD BUT UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS OF TERRORISM THIS COUNTRY HAS FACED WE WOULD UNDERSTAND THE GOVERNMENT'S REASONS FOR TOUGH MEASURES. IT IS DIFFICULT TO POINT TO "CASES" IN WHICH OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES CAN BE SAID TO HAVE BROUGHT AMELIORATION, ALTHOUGH OUR POLICY HAS IN A GENERAL WAY SENSITIZED ARGENTINA'S LEADERS TO WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AND HAS LENT RESPECTABILITY WITHIN ARGENTINA TO AN ISSUE-- HUMAN RIGHTS--WHICH HAD EARLIER BEEN TREATED AS A PARIAH.

9. FACTIONS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ENDORSE THE BRAZILIAN "TOUGH-IT-OUT" APPROACH WHICH THEY BELIEVE RESULTED IN GREATER ATTENTION AND RESPECT (AND BACKING OFF ON HUMAN RIGHTS) BY THE US TOWARD BRAZIL. IT HAS ALSO BECOME APPARENT THAT SOME ELEMENTS WITHIN THE MILITARY ARE ATTEMPTING TO USE US CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS TO ADVANCE THEIR OWN POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS (SEE BUENOS AIRES 0743 (NOTAL)). (IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT CURRENT STRUGGLES WITHIN THE JUNTA ARE BASED ON POWER, NOT HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES. THE ARMED FORCES SHARE A JOINT HARD-LINE ATTITUDE WHERE TERRORISM IS CONCERNED.)

10. IN SUCH AN EMOTIONAL AND HIGHLY CHARGED ATMOSPHERE, GREATER FLEXIBILITY FOR THE AMBASSADOR WOULD PERMIT HIM TO RECOGNIZE AND RECORD IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENERALLY TO PLAY A MORE DECISIVE ROLE IN ATTAINING US OBJECTIVES. AT THIS POINT CONGRESSIONAL CONSTRAINTS, AS WELL AS DEPARTMENT POLICY, ARE CLOSE BINDING. IN THE NEAR TERM, THIS MIGHT INCLUDE FLEXIBILITY REGARDING APPROVAL OF VARIOUS FMS CASH CASES NOT RELATED TO INTERNAL SECURITY, AUTHORIZATION OF CASH PURCHASES OF US MILITARY TRAINING FOR ARGENTINE MILITARY PERSONNEL AND RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON CASH PURCHASE OF SPARE  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BUENOS 00812 02 OF 03 011937Z

PARTS FOR US-ORIGIN EQUIPMENT PREVIOUSLY PURCHASED BY ARGENTINA. IN THE MIDDLE TERM, IT COULD INCLUDE EXPANDING THE PERSONNEL EXCHANGE PROGRAM (PEP) AND REVIEWING THE VALIDITY OF THE PRESENT SANCTIONS POLICY AND LEGISLATION AGAINST ARGENTINA.

11. THE ARGENTINE MILITARY REMAINS CONVINCED THAT BILATERAL PROBLEMS WITH THE US OVER HUMAN RIGHTS STEM FROM US MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE ARGENTINE INTERNAL SITUATION AND THE EFFECT OF A WELL-ORGANIZED INTERNATIONAL DEFAMATION CAMPAIGN. US SANCTIONS HAVE LEFT LITTLE ROOM FOR MANEUVER, BUT IT IS LIKELY THE ARGENTINE MILITARY WILL CONTINUE TO STRESS TO THEIR US COUNTERPARTS THE INTERNAL TERRORIST THREAT, THE TACIT SUPPORT OF LARGE SECTORS OF THE POPULATION IN FAVOR OF ITS ANTI-SUBVERSION CAMPAIGN, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST PROPAGANDA IN AN APPEAL FOR GREATER US UNDERSTANDING TOWARD AN IMPROVEMENT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS.

12. THE PEP AND MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL IN CEMENTING PERSONAL TIES AND OPENING CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION AS WELL AS ORIENTING ARGENTINES IN THE US DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM AND VALUES.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BUENOS 00812 03 OF 03 012029Z  
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00  
SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 AID-05 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-08  
IGA-02 HA-05 EUR-12 AF-10 OES-07 DOE-11 SOE-02  
DOEE-00 AGRE-00 MCT-01 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03  
PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 IO-13 ACDA-12 MCE-00  
/139 W

-----120957 012033Z /41

O R 011851Z FEB 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO RUEHCSECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4395  
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION  
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY LIMA  
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 0812

13. THE EMBASSY'S CURRENT EXPECTATIONS OF NEAR AND MID-TERM TRENDS ARE THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL MODERNIZE THEIR FORCES BY PURCHASES FROM THIRD COUNTRIES (PRIMARILY EUROPE) IF THEY CANNOT GET WHAT THEY REQUIRE FROM THE US. NEAR TERM SERVICES, INCLUDING TRAINING AND SOME EQUIPMENT, ARE NOW BEING PURCHASED FROM EUROPE AND MAJOR EQUIPMENT SALES ARE PRESENTLY BEING NEGOTIATED WITH EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS. THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK IS TO SHIFT THE LOGISTIC BASE FROM THE US TO EUROPE WITH STRONG EMPHASIS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ARGENTINE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX THROUGH LICENSING AGREEMENTS. FOR ECONOMIC AND PRESTIGE REASONS, ARGENTINA WILL ALSO SEEK TO BECOME AN ARMS EXPORTER IN ITS OWN RIGHT.

14. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS SHIFT AWAY FROM US ARMS  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BUENOS 00812 03 OF 03 012029Z

SUPPLIERS ANOTHER EFFECT WILL BE THE LOSS OF MODERATING US INFLUENCE ON HEMISPHERIC ARMS PURCHASES, AND THE INCREASED PROBABILITY OF AN ARMS RACE IN LATIN AMERICA. ARGENTINES ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT AS LONG AS THE US IS THE CHIEF ARMS PURVEYOR TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, IT CAN EFFECTIVELY CONTROL THE OVERALL ARMS BALANCE ON THE CONTINENT. A SENIOR ARGENTINE AIR FORCE GENERAL HAS SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE MILITARY UNDERSTANDS THIS AND ACCEPTS THIS CONTROL AS PART OF THE PRICE HIS COUNTRY MUST PAY TO GET US EQUIPMENT, WHICH THEY PREFER. BY FORFEITING ITS LEVERAGE BY REFUSING TO SELL ARMS AT ALL, THE US IN EFFECT OPENS UP THE REGION TO THIRD COUNTRY ARMS DEALERS WHO MAY EITHER BE LESS CONSCIENTIOUS OR LESS ABLE TO INFLUENCE ARMS PURCHASES IN THE REGION AS A WHOLE. THIS SITUATION COULD LEAD TO SERIOUS ARMS IMBALANCES--AS CAN ALREADY BE SEEN IN THE CASE OF PERU, WHICH OBTAINED SIZEABLE QUANTITIES OF SOPHISTICATED ARMS FROM THE SOVIETS TO THE IMMENSE CHAGRIN OF ITS ANDEAN NEIGHBORS.  
CASTRO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** FOREIGN RELATIONS, MILITARY AGREEMENTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 01 feb 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978BUENOS00812  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780048-0826  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** BUENOS AIRES  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t197802108/aaaadney.tel  
**Line Count:** 376  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** f27708ce-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION ARA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 7  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 77 STATE 306726  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 22 jun 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3446883  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** US-LATIN AMERICA MILITARY RELATIONS: ARGENTINA  
**TAGS:** MPOL, MASS, MORG, PGOV, SHUM, AR  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/f27708ce-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014